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The Extent of Municipal Liability in Negligence:
Forecasting the Future in Canada

Carolyn Berardino*
In the 1990 decision of Murphy v. Brentwood District Council, I
the British House of Lords unanimously overruled the landmark judgement in Anns v. Merton District Council .2 In his judgement, Lord Keith
states:
My Lords, I would hold that Anns was wrongly decided
as regards the scope of any private law duty of care
resting on local authorities in relation to their function
of taking steps to secure compliance with building
byelaws or regulations ... 3
This decision runs contrary to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in
Kamloops v. Nielsen.4 In light of this development, it is valuable to
speculate upon whether Murphy will affect the liability of public authorities in Canada.
Prior toAnns, negligence on the part of the public authority did
not automatically give rise to liability in tort. In Home Office v. Dorset
Yacht,5 the Court of Appeal held that in determining liability of public
authorities the first question that must be asked was whether the
alleged act or omission was ultra vires. A public authority's act or
omission would be ultra vires if the act was one which it had no
jurisdiction to make or, in rare circumstances, ifthe act was tainted by
a substantive defect such as irrationality, extreme unreasonableness, or
improper purpose. The public law notion of ultra vires differentiated
actions against local authorities from those against private individuals.
In addition, a public authority could also be held liable for breach
of statutory duty. With this type of action, the empowering legislation
determined the scope of the duty owed by the public authority and the
remedy available in the event of breach.
In summary, beforeAnns, a public authority could be held liable
for breach of statutory duty or, if the ultra vires hurdle was cleared, for
negligence in common law. This situation meant that a public authority
was less likely to be held liable for negligent acts or omissions than a
private individual.
Anns significantly increased the liability potential for public
authorities. In the majority judgement, Lord Wilberforce states:
The problem which this type of action creates is to define
the circumstances in which the law should impose, over
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and above, or perhaps alongside, these public law powers and duties, a duty in private law towards individuals
such that they may sue for damages in a civil court. 6
Prior to this decision, public authority liability was based on
either statute (breach of statutory duty) or the common law. Lord
Wilberforce implies that liability could be based on a combination of the
two.7
·
Lord Wilberforce increased the liability potential even further
with his general duty of care formula. In the first step of his test, he
asked whether there was sufficient proximity between the parties that
damage to the plaintiff was a foreseeable outcome of carelessness on the
part of the defendant. In the second step, he asked whether there were
policy or other considerations which ought to limit or negate the prima
facie duty established in the first step of his test. Because of the broad
scope of the first step of this test, and the fact that the test was one that
established a duty at the onset and then limited or negated the duty as
a 'secondary' stage, this test favoured the plaintiff and thus expanded the
liability potential of defendant public authorities.
In an attempt to determine exactly when a public authority
liability could arise, Lord Wilberforce distinguished between policy and
operational decisions. 8 Policy decisions cover government choices premised on social, economic, or political factors. If made within the jurisdiction conferred on the public authority, such choices are subject to judicial
review only if one of the recognized grounds of substantive ultra vi res is
proved. On the other hand, operational decisions, which involve the
implementation of the decided policy, are reviewable under the Anns
test. Lord Wilberforce states:
Although this distinction .. .is convenient, and illuminating, it is probably a distinction of degree; many "operational" powers or duties have in them some element of
"discretion." It can safely be said that the more "operational" a power or duty may be, the easier it is to
superimpose upon it a common law duty of care. 9
While this distinction is a useful concept, its practical application is
fraught with difficulties.
Lord Wilberforce also stated that public authorities could be
held liable for failing to exercise their statutory powers.IO Consequently, if the public authority was entrusted with a power, liability
could arise with regards to either the manner in which the action was
carried out or, ifthe power was deemed to be discretionary, the decision
or lack of decision to exercise that power. This second situation covered
instances where policy considerations enter the operational realm.
In Kamloops v. Nielsen, the majority of the Supreme Court of
Canada applied theAnns test. The court held that the public authority's
duty to properly inspect building foundations extended to the prevention
of continued construction and occupancy of buildings which had failed
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to meet inspection standards. In the majority judgement, Madame
Justice Wilson states:
.. .I think that this is an appropriate case for the application of the principle inAnns. I do not think the appellant
can take any comfort from the distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance where there is a duty to act or,
at the very least, to make a conscious decision not to act
on policy grounds. In my view inaction for no reason or
inaction for improper reason cannot be a policy decision
taken in the bona fide exercise of discretion.11

In response to the argument that an expansion of the liability
potential of public authorities might well expose them to "liability in an
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class ... ".12 Madame Justice Wilson held that the Anns approach
contained "its own built in barriers ... ".13 These included the relevant
statute and the distinction between policy and operational decisions.
In Murphy, the House of Lords categorically overruledAnns. It
is significant that while counsel for the defendant in this case was
prepared to concede that the District Authority did owe a common law
duty to persons who might foreseeably suffer injury to their person or
property, the law lords did not affirm the existence of such a duty. Lord
Bridge states:
... a duty of care of a scope sufficient to make the authority liable ... can only be based on the principle ofreliance
and ... there is nothing in the ordinary relationship of a
local authority, as statutory supervisor of building operations, and the purchaser of a defective building capable of giving rise to such a duty.14
Importantly, Lord Keith states that the damage suffered inAnns was in
fact purely economic loss.15 Lord Oliver expresses aversion to decisions
in which public authorities shoulder the burden of paying for damages
caused by negligent individuals.16 The Murphy decision severely restricts the possibility of recovery for economic loss against public authorities.
In Murphy, the House of Lords also rejected theAnns concept of
a prima facie duty of care.17 It favoured the approach taken by the
Australian High Court in Sutherland Shire v. Heyman.18 In that case,
Mr. Justice Brennan held:
It is preferable in my view that the law should develop
novel categories of negligence incremental and by analogy with established categories, rather than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained
only by indefinable "considerations which ought to nega-
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tive, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the class
of persons to whom it is owed".19
One year prior to the Kamloops decision the Supreme Court of
Canada, in R v. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool,20 refused to recognize
breach of statutory duty as a nominate tort. Giving judgement for the
majority, Mr. Justice Dickson, as he then was, held that such a breach
should be considered under the ambit of the general law of negligence.
This decision, which may be interpreted as supporting the use of a
general duty of care, expands the liability potential of public authorities.
Five years after Kamloops, in Just v. Right of British Columbia, 21 the Supreme Court specifically addressed the distinction between
policy and operational decisions made by public authorities. The court
held that secondary policy decisions that fell within the operational
sphere were subject to the common law of negligence; only pure policy
decisions were immune from liability in negligence. Thus, on the facts of
this case, only the initial decision to implement highway inspection
system could be classified as a policy decision. All subsequent decisions
were to be reviewed on the operational level and subject to the common
law duty of care.
In 1989, in Rothfield v. Manolalws,22 the Supreme Court
considered a situation similar to Kamloops. In this case, however, the
plaintiffhomeowners negligently failed to observe the municipal by-law.
While all of the justices agreed that the city was negligent, the effect of
the homeowner's negligence was the subject of divergent opinion. Only
Mr. Justice Cory held that the homeowner's negligence absolved the city
from any liability.23 Mr. Justice La Forest stated that the homeowners
were contributorily liable. 24 Madame Justice Wilson went even further;
she stated that the homeowners should bear no responsibility at all.25
This decision illustrates the court's readiness to hold public authorities
liable in negligence.
Since the House of Lords decision in Murphy, three Canadian
cases have dealt with similar issues. In Petrie v. Groome,26 the British
Columbia Supreme Court refused to follow Murphy. In this case, the
District of North Vancouver was held liable for negligently approving
building foundations. Although the private contl'actors were also held
to be liable, judgement in full was entered against the municipality.
This decision, which is currently under appeal, follows the current
readiness to hold public authorities liable in negligence.
In Arsenault v. Charlottetown City,27 the court followed Anns.
In this case, the defendant city was held liable in negligence for failing
to enforce its by-laws. In his judgement, Mr. Justice McQuaid states:
"Anns, as interpreted by Kamloops ... nonetheless remains the law as it
prevails in Canada ... ".28 Notably, however, the learned judge also
quotes at length from Lord Keith's judgement in Murphy. This reference
suggests that Mr. Justice McQuaid applies Anns with some reluctance.
To date, the 1991 decision of Macaulay v. Wagorn29 is the only
Canadian case that has followed Murphy. In this case, however, the
action against the Crown was settled before trial and the case essentially

a
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dealt with an action between private litigants. In his judgement, Mr.
Justice Charron states:
The House of Lords later revisited the Anns case in
Murphy ... and, although it overruled the case in some
respect, it confirmed that the principle of Donoghue v.
Stephenson did indeed apply "so as to place the builder
of premises under a duty to take reasonable care to avoid
injury through defects in the premises to the person or
property of those whom he should have in contemplation
as likely to suffer such injury if care is not taken." 30
Not only does this case follow Murphy, it suggests a possible alternative
to the Murphy - Kamloops dilemma.
As previously discussed, the House of Lords in Murphy did not
categorically state that public authorities owed no duty at all to parties
with whom they deal. It must be emphasized, however, that Murphy
essentially dealt with recovery for economic loss. As Lord Keith states:
Liability under the Anns decision is postulated on the
existence of a presence of imminent danger to health or
safety. But, considering that the loss involved in incurring expenditure to avert the danger is pure economic
loss, there would seem to be no logic confining the
remedy to cases where such danger exists.31
While the Murphy decision warns against classifying de facto
economic loss as physical loss, it does not completely reject such recovery. To recover for pure economic loss, a strong proximate relationship
is required as well as an element ofreliance. A strict test for the recovery
of economic loss was advocated by all of the law lords.
In his article, "What Has Become of Anns?'',32 W.S. Schlosser
refers to the words of Madame Justice Wilson in Kamloops. Madame
Justice Wilson states:
In order to obtain recovery for economic loss the statute
has to create a private law duty to the plaintiff alongside
the public duty ... Finally, and perhaps this merits some
emphasis economic loss will only be recoverable if as a
matter of statutory interpretation it is a type of loss the
statute intended to guard against.33
This quotation supports the idea that the decisions in Murphy and
Kamloops can coexist; it suggests that the use of the Anns test in
Kamloops will not automatically lead to recovery for pure economic loss.
It is important to remember that while Murphy advocates an
incremental approach to the law of negligence, the decision does not
overrule the Donoghue v. Stephenson34 neighbour principle, nor does it
overrule Dorset Yacht.35 Both of these cases may be considered as
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specific examples of the incremental approach within the tort of negligence. Consequently, if Kamloops can fit into an established tort
category, or if it can be distinguished from Anns, it may be seen as
compatible with the Murphy approach.
In his article, Schlosser advocates a narrow view of Kamloops.
He states that the duty of a municipality is "similar to that found in
rescuer cases". 36 Thus, having taken an initial affirmative action to stop
the negligent building, the city of Kamloops was obliged to follow
through with that action according to reasonable standards. This
analysis distinguishes Kamloops from Anns.
Before predicting the effect that Murphy may have on the
liability of public authorities in Canada, the policy issues underlying the
Kamloops and Murphy decisions must be addressed. Anns emphasized
accident compensation and loss distribution. The decision may be
viewed as one in which the burden of damages is placed on the one who
is in the best position to pay: the public authority. Sympathy for the
plaintiff, in this case a private homeowner, and recognition of the fact
that contractors and builders are notorious for 'escaping' liability support the expansion of the liability potential of public authorities. In
Kamloops, Madame Justice Wilson states:
The only area, in my view, which leaves scope for honest
concern is ... where the operational subsumes what might
be called secondary policy considerations, i.e. policy
considerations at the secondary level. 37
She continues :
On the assumption that by and large municipalities and
their officials discharge their responsibilities in a conscientious fashion, I believe that such a failure will be the
exception rather than the rule and that the scope for
application of the principle in Anns will be relatively
narrow. I do not see it, as do some commentators, as
potentially ruinous financially to municipalities. I do see
it as a useful protection to the citizen whose everincreasing reliance on public officials seems to be a
feature of our age ... 38
The object of holding governmental authorities more accountable for
their actions is seen as an important underlying consideration.
Conversely, the House of Lords in Murphy emphasized the
importance of adhering to strict legal principle. They abhorred a situation in which a public authority would be held liable for damages which
were in fact caused by private individuals. To expand the liability of
public authorities would discourage the maintenance of high building
standards and adversely affect the private consumer. The House of
Lords stressed that ifthere was a defect in the law with regards to the
liability of public authorities, such a defect was to be remedied by
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Parliament, not the judiciary. It is notable that in Canada, particularly
since the advent of the Charter39, the Supreme Court has relaxed its
strict adherence to the separation of powers doctrine.
It is submitted that in both legal principle and underlying policy,
the Canadian tradition follows Anns v. Merton. In determining the effect
that Murphy will have on the future of liability of public authorities in
negligence, it must be re-emphasized that Murphy primarily dealt with
recovery for economic loss. By applying the criteria of close proximity
and reliance set forth in Murphy, the Canadian courts could severely
restrict recovery for economic loss in negligence actions against public
authorities. They could thus restrict the liability potential of public
authorities without contradicting Anns.

*

Third year law student, Dalhousie University.

1. (1990] 2 All E.R. 908 (H.L.) [hereinafter Murphy].
2. Anns v. Merton District Council,[1978] AC. 720 (H.L.) [hereinafter Anns].
3. Murphy, supra, note 1 at 923.
4. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter Kamloops}.
5. [1970] AC. 1004 (H.L.) [hereinafter Dorset Yacht}.
6. Anns, supra, note 2 at 754.
7. The Honourable Sir Gerard Brennan, A.C., K.B.E., "Liability in Negligence of Public
Authorities: The Divergent Views" in Donohue v. Stephenson and the Modern Law of
Negligence, The Paisley Papers, (Vancouver: Continuing Legal Education Society of British
Columbia, 1991) at 79-115.
8. Anns, supra note 2 at 754.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Kamloops, supra, note 4 at 24.
12. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 74 A.L.R. 1139, 1145 (N.Y. App 1931).
13. Kamloops, supra, note 4 at 25.
14. Murphy, supra, note 1 at 930.
15.lbid.
16. Ibid., at 936.
17. Ibid., at 934-935.
18. (1085), 59 A.L.J.R. 564 (H.C.).
19. Ibid., at 588.
20. [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205.
21. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228.
22. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1259.
23. Ibid., at 1289.
24. Ibid., at 1277.
25. Ibid., at 1295.
26. (9 August 1991), Vancouver C89 23 79 (B.C.S.C.).
27. (10 January 1991), Charlottletown GSC-7863 (P.E.I.S.C., T.D.).
28. Ibid.
29. (11 March 1991), Ottawa 14023/87 (Ont.H.C., G.D.).
30. Ibid., citing Murphy, supra, note 1 at 916.
31. Murphy, supra, note 1 at 922.
32. (1991) 24 Alta. L. Rev.673 at 699.
33. Kamloops, supra, note 4 at 35.
34. (1932] All E.R. Rep. 1 CH.L.).
35. Supra, note 5.
36. Schlosser, supra, note 32 at 699.
37. Kamloops, supra, note 4 at 25-26.
38. Ibid.

174

DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES
39. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c.11.

